Category: Theology

Giving Transcendence its Due

I think many issues arise mainly because transcendence is widely under-appreciated. A particular issue that has recently caught my attention is the supposed heresy of “adoptionism”. One place this comes up is in Hebrews 1:2-5; 5:1-10. Christ, as Son of God, was the agent of creation, from the beginning; yet He was appointed and begotten when He ascended to the right hand of the Majesty. These are the two sides of the paradox of the eternal pre-existing Son of God / Logos, who was also appointed and begotten after His resurrection, due to His obedience (or, alternatively, at His baptism). In order to preserve His full eternal deity, such adoptionistic statements are traditionally interpreted to mean merely His manifestation and revelation as the Son and the King, or the accomplishment of His specifically soteriological mission. I propose it is better to give full weight to both sides of this paradox, and not try to reconcile them within an analytical system of thought.

When speaking of deity, we are attempting to talk about that which transcends space and time. All analytical / conceptual thought, which depends upon space-time metaphors, is therefore inadequate. Any attempt to analytically reconcile such paradoxes will severely and unnecessarily distort the truths that are revealed in the simple assertion of the paradox. It is better to simply accept and embrace such paradoxes. We should consider eternity as including and embracing temporality, in that it transcends the conceptual distinction between eternity and temporality.

The particular paradox of eternal sonship being qualified by incarnation was addressed by Robert Jenson, in saying there is no Logos asarkos. The eternal Son, from the beginning, is founded upon the temporal life of Jesus of Nazareth. By extension, the entire creation, from the beginning, is in some sense causally dependent upon his life as a man. We should give full weight to this bottom-up Christology, and not compromise it for the sake of top-down Christology. I think this was an important point in Pannenberg’s theology. To honor what is revealed, we must fully accept each side of this paradox as equally valid partial truths. To do otherwise would compromise the full truth.

Another application of temporal transcendence is the doctrine of justification. Justification in the present is based on a future completed lifetime of faithfulness. This is because salvation depends upon participation in Christ, which is an eternal transcendent reality. Any attempt to reconcile all aspects of atonement within an analytical system will result in a distortion that fails to represent the full truth. It is better to live with the tension between the assurance of hope and the obligation to persevere: another teaching from Hebrews.

Similarly, there are paradoxes related to space and spatial relationships. The unity of all things, in One, transcends the diversity of the many in space, but in a way that embraces and includes the spatial diversity of the many. This would apply to the paradox of corporate versus individual identity, and the related doctrines of unity and participation in Adam and in Christ. The answer, again, is to accept the paradox.

Such observations also apply to the more general disputes about open theism – whether God is permitted to be mutable and passionate – for the non-contingent God to be partly defined by the contingent creation. This further relates to the distinction between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity. We can and should accept that the immanent Trinity includes and embraces all that can be said about the economic Trinity; what we say about the economic Trinity should therefore be accepted as fully valid, but partial, truth. Perhaps this is what Karl Rahner meant to say. The transcendent God is both passionately responsive and steadfastly dependable, even though systematic thinking sees it as paradoxical.

To state it more generally, transcendence transcends even the concept of transcendence. On difficult subjects like this, I often ask “what would Kierkegaard say?” In this, I think he would concur.

Forgiveness and Justice

Forgiveness means that there will be no actions taken against the offending party, and that everything possible will be done to restore the relationship. The offended party will forgo retribution and will grant the benefits of restored relationship, as far as possible. This is controversial, both among people of faith and among those who are “of the world”, in that a sense of justice and righteousness demands punishment for sin. The Christian answer is, first of all, that we defer to God to execute judgment (Romans 12:19). Secondly, God forgives on the basis of atonement: punishing sin, and cleansing the sinner. This is the uniquely Christian answer to how forgiveness is possible, without compromising justice.

Nevertheless, there are still consequences to the sin or offense, outside the control or authority of the one who forgives. And although the one who forgives has a genuine intention and commitment to restore relationship, the full realization of restoration and its benefits is contingent upon cooperation from the offender. Consider the parable of the prodigal Son. The father’s attitude and intentions were unconditional, but the realization of restoration and its benefits were contingent upon the son returning to the father. Similarly with God’s forgiveness. The scope of His forgiveness includes a commitment to full reconciliation, with the consequent granting of eternal life. But this can be realized only with the cooperation of the sinner. For this reason, the full implementation of forgiveness from God requires either 1) that the offender sinned in ignorance, or 2) the offender repents of the sin(s). An example of contingency upon the sinner’s ignorance is Jesus’s statement on the cross (Luke 23:34), which was probably also the basis for Stephen’s request that his executioners be forgiven (Acts 7:60). Examples of contingency upon repentance are John the Baptist’s preaching (Matthew 3:7-10) and Peter’s sermon (Acts 2:38). Also, the gospels make forgiveness contingent upon faith (Luke 7:48-50), and John’s letter makes it contingent upon confession (1 John 1:9). Since genuine faith, confession and repentance are necessarily linked, each one implies all three.

Note that forgiveness goes beyond mere words and thoughts. It includes doing all that can be done to achieve reconciliation. God’s forgiveness is not a mere decree that dismisses or overlooks sin, it involves the commitment to actually deal with sin, by atonement, on the cross. When Jesus told people their sins were forgiven, He was committing Himself to the cross. When the prodigal son returned, the Father went out to meet him on the road, and he followed through by providing all the benefits of reconciliation. Consider also how Jesus’s healing ministry was linked to forgiveness, in that forgiveness was the condition for healing, and healing was the consequence of forgiveness (Mark 2:5-12). Forgiveness is not of word only, but in deed and truth.

One of the issues in forgiving one another is whether the relationship after forgiveness is fully restored to how it was before the sin was known. The answer is no, because the discovery of the sin, in spite of subsequent repentance, may reveal a spiritual immaturity and weakness that was previously unrecognized. Especially in regard to entrusting someone with a ministry, we have a duty to the church to consider what has been learned about the person’s qualifications. To appoint or retain someone in a ministry for which he is unqualified is no favor either to that person or to the church, and is not entailed in forgiveness. Similarly for an abusive spouse: a Christian should forgive, and not seek personal vengeance; but restoration should only take place after there are signs and fruit of genuine repentance. There is no duty or expectation to submit to abuse or to accept risk of harm.

Another question is how forgiveness differs from other related aspects of salvation, such as atonement, reconciliation, redemption and justification. First, forgiveness is based upon the assumption that sin – its power and its consequences – is somehow disposed of, but the concept of forgiveness does not indicate how this is done. Secondly, forgiveness pertains only to removal of past sins and their consequences, but does not address the absolute victory over sin and death, or the means for granting righteousness and life. A third point is that forgiveness, under the new covenant, emphasizes the individual, while the full scope of atonement and salvation also pertains to corporate salvation and the cosmic destiny of the creation. These other aspects of salvation are addressed by the concepts of atonement, redemption, justification, etc. These concepts are not identical and interchangeable, but are complementary aspects of God’s total salvific work. It is within this broader context that forgiveness can be understood and embraced.

A Substitute or a Partner?

It is generally claimed that penal substitution and participatory models of atonement are compatible as complementary, alternative perspectives on atonement, and that the debate primarily concerns their relative priority: which view is over-arching and which is subordinate. It seems to me, however, that there is a fundamental inconsistency between the two models. If substitution means a strict “instead-of” replacement, then it would seem to preclude a participatory communion or fellowship. If Christ died instead of us, then how is it that we unite with Him in death? Furthermore, in what sense did He die, but we do not also die? He died a bodily death because of taking on our sins. But each of us also dies a physical, bodily death because of our sins. In our spiritual union with Him, by faith, He took our sins upon Himself, not as a removal of sins, but as a sharing of sins. The sins are then subsequently removed, i.e. condemned and destroyed, in both His bodily death and in our own bodily death, as we are united in death. The second part of the “sweet exchange” (2 Corinthians 5:21) is that His righteousness is shared with us: the life-giving, cleansing power of His blood, resulting in our resurrection with Him. There is therefore no spiritual death, either for Christ or for us who are in Him. As it was for the repentant thief, we pass from death to be with Him in paradise, to await resurrection. All of this is a matter of participatory sharing, not of “substitution”. It is a union with Him that begins at the cross, continues in paradise, and is carried through into the resurrection and new creation. There is no point throughout this fellowship where He experiences something without us, nor where we experience something without Him.

How does this relate to OT sacrifices? To regard any of them as penal-substitutionary (a death instead-of, as punishment for sin) is also a misunderstanding. The animals slain for atonement and for sin were not regarded as bearing the peoples’ sins. To the contrary, they were holy and unblemished. Their blood was a source of life, with power to purify, to cleanse, to sanctify, to make acceptable for God’s presence. Similarly, the Passover lamb was slain, not to receive punishment for sin, but to provide the blood that would protect against death. It was the life-giving blood that sanctifies, so that the Lord could be present, and thus deliver them from death. The only animal upon which sins were bestowed was the scapegoat, which was driven away from the camp, unsuitable as a sacrifice. The only sacrifice that was “substitutionary” was the redemption of the firstborn. But that had nothing to do with sin. It was an acknowledgement that the firstborn belongs to God, and a sign that all Israel, as God’s firstborn, belongs to Him. All these offerings point to Christ for their fulfillment, representing several aspects of what He accomplished on the cross. But none of them entail penal substitution.

In the texts used to defend the substitution model, which speak of His dying for us or for our sins, the word “for” is a translation of hyper (e.g. John 10:11; Romans 5:8) or peri (as in Romans 8:3-4; 1 Thess 5:10; 1 John 2:2). Both prepositions would have the meaning of “on behalf of” or “for the sake of” in these contexts. The idea of a substitutionary “instead-of” is a possible interpretation, but is by no means required. All these texts could just as well be interpreted as “on behalf of, by virtue of participatory fellowship”. Similarly, the texts in Isaiah 53 (53:4-6, 8, 10-12) do not require a substitutionary interpretation, but can be understood as sharing our sins, griefs and punishment. Note Isaiah 53:12 – “[He] was numbered with the transgressors; yet He Himself bore the sin of many, and interceded for the transgressors.” The transgressors, with whom He was numbered, were not just the adjacent crucified thieves; they were the “many” for whom He bore sins and interceded. This indicates participatory fellowship, not substitution. One might also consider John 11:50, where Caiaphas declares that one man should die instead of the nation. There are two reasons why this is not directly applicable to penal-substitution: 1) it is reasoned as a matter of political expediency, not punishment for sin; 2) it pertains to the death of the nation, corporately, rather than to the death of individuals.

In view of all the texts that explicitly and definitively teach participation, that must be the model of choice, rather than penal substitution.